The Role of Theory in History Since 1945: Ontological vs. Epistemological Approaches

Before examining the role of theory in history since 1945, essential conceptual clarification is required. The dual meaning of history as res gestae (the actual events) and historia rerum gestarum (the account of those events) necessitates a fundamental distinction. Consequently, theory in history addresses either history as an object of study or the knowledge of that object. We therefore differentiate between material or ontological theories of history, which propose a specific mode of being for historical processes, and epistemological theories, which posit the characteristics of historical knowledge. These categories are intrinsically linked, as assumptions about the nature of history inform how we can know and study it.

Ontological theories often present history as shaped by underlying mechanisms, such as class struggle or nation-formation. These frameworks are interconnected with epistemological stances asserting that historical knowledge must be empirical and law-like. Methodologically, this translates to a strong emphasis on causal factors and generalizing explanations. In historical practice, this approach is evident in social scientific history, which dominated the 1960s and 1970s, seeking explanatory power through analysis of structural determinants and societal forces.

In contrast, other ontological theories prioritize intentionality, contingency, and meaningful human action over deterministic mechanisms. These are linked to epistemological theories focused on understanding the meaning of actions and linguistic expressions. The corresponding methodology is hermeneutical, aiming for interpretive understanding rather than causal explanation. This perspective gained prominence with the new cultural history from the 1980s onward, shifting explanatory emphasis from impersonal factors to the agency and experiences of historical actors.

After 1945, explicit ontological inquiries faced severe suspicion, notably from Karl Popper. Holistic metaphysics of history, which presupposed supra-individual entities like "races" or "classes," was criticized as a conceptual foundation for totalitarian politics. Both logical positivism and Popper’s falsificationism academically declared substantial philosophy of history dead. During the Cold War, theorists like Marxists or Arnold Toynbee were often dismissed as ideologues, and ontological individualism prevailed. This anti-ontological trend was renewed by postmodernism and its critique of grand narratives.

Consequently, the connection between ontological and epistemological problems largely disappeared from historico-theoretical agendas. However, a significant shift occurred with the late-20th-century surge of interest in memory. This has prompted a renewed focus on ontological questions concerning the presence of the past and the ontology of social objects, bringing metaphysics back into theoretical discussion.

Although consensus in the theory of history remains elusive, scholars largely agree on a threefold periodization since 1945. The first period, from approximately 1945 to 1970, was dominated by analytical philosophy of history. This was superseded from the 1970s to 1990 by narrative philosophy of history, a shift driven by the linguistic turn and often termed representationalism. Since the late 1980s, a third period has emerged, characterized by salient themes of memory, trauma, the sublime, and the presence of the past. While no definitive philosophical label exists, this tendency is increasingly discussed under the rubric of presence.