The Sicilian Expedition: Athens' Catastrophic Failures in the Peloponnesian War

After the Peace of Nicias in 421, which brought the first phase of the Peloponnesian War to a close, nothing had actually been resolved. Athens decided to renew its plan of expansion in 416 by taking the island of Melos and receiving a request from Segesta in Sicily for aid against some of the neighboring cities. Athenian ambassadors arrived at Segesta and were fooled into thinking that the city had more resources than it really did.

The Athenians debated the request for help, with Nicias opposed to it and Alcibiades, the nephew of Pericles, supporting it, and the latter carried the day. The Athenians then put Alcibiades, Lamachus (a capable general), and Nicias in charge of the expedition. Before the expedition set sail, a religious atrocity occurred with the mutilation of the Herms in Athens. Alcibiades was suspected of the deed and when he demanded to be tried before the expedition sailed, the charges were delayed. The fleet of 100 warships and 30,000 combatants, including 5,000 hoplites, sailed in the early summer of 415. When the fleet arrived, it found that Segesta did not have the promised funds.

Nicias suggested that the fleet sail about the island and make a show of strength and then leave; Alcibiades suggested that they get allies from the other cities and come back to help Segesta; and Lamachus realized that the main objective was Syracuse, so he suggested that since Syracuse was not well organized, they attack right away. If Lamachus’s plan had been adopted, the city and island probably would have fallen. Instead, they decided to follow Alcibiades’s plan, but before he could put it into action, the Athenians decreed that he should be brought back for trial.

Alcibiades escaped and arrived in Sparta, where a delegation from Syracuse had also come to seek help. Alcibiades suggested that Sparta send a capable general, who would be more valuable than an army, and fortify the Decelea camp in Attica to cut off the supply of silver so that Athens could not finance its fleet in Sicily. The Athenians in Sicily under Nicias fritted away the remaining campaigning season, allowing Syracuse time to reorganize.

The Athenian expedition force in 414 now attacked Syracuse, hoping to force them into submission. They seized the high ground of Epipolae and fortified the nearby area of Labdalon, but not the heights. The Athenians began building a wall to cut off the city from reinforcements. During the building, the Athenians destroyed a Syracusan counter wall and attacked a ditch going through the swamp. Again, the Athenians’ attack was successful but their general, Lamachus, was killed. Thinking he had won, Nicias failed to complete the wall even after he heard that help for Syracuse from Sparta was arriving. The Spartan general Gylippus now arrived and, seeing the unfinished Athenian wall, made his way to the undefended heights of Epipolae, depriving the Athenians of an advantage. He then decided to build a counterwall against the Athenian wall. Both sides raced to complete their wall, with Syracuse winning.

The Athenians had failed to complete their wall or fortify the heights; doing either would have curtailed Gylippus. The Athenian fleet had sailed into the Great Harbor at Syracuse and occupied the southern shores, building three forts; unfortunately, they were near the swamps where disease infected the army. At this point, with winter arriving, Nicias sent a report indicating that Lamachus had been killed and that the situation was not to Athens’s advantage. He requested either that he be allowed to return, or that a larger force be sent out and he be relieved of duty. Once again, Athens failed to realize that it had the wrong commander in place and allowed a second fleet with more troops under Demosthenes to be sent. Before the second fleet arrived, though, Gylippus decided to attack the Athenian forts and fleet. While their fleet was successful, the Athenians lost their forts and were forced to hole up in an even more tenuous situation. The Athenians attempted another sea battle, but this time they were defeated.

In 413, the second fleet with seventy-three warships and 5,000 more hoplites and a large number of auxiliaries arrived under Demosthenes, and seeing the destruction of the Athenian fleet, realized that he needed to seize the heights and wall. The attack failed, and Demosthenes suggested leaving the encampment near the marsh. Nicias, however, could not be persuaded and opted to remain. He had refused the counsel of Lamachus to attack Syracuse at the beginning, which probably would have won the war, and now he failed to listen to Demosthenes, which would have saved his army. Finally, after the delay allowed Gylippus to arrive with reinforcements, Nicias agreed to flee, but on August 27, a lunar eclipse occurred, and the priests said they had to wait until the next full moon.

With the departure postponed, the Syracusan fleet and army became bolder. The Athenian fleet moved out but was defeated since it could not use its advantage of maneuvering in the confined space of the harbor. The defeat now broke the Athenians’ morale, and with the harbor now blockaded, the fleet made one last attempt on September 9. It was again defeated, and the Athenians on land panicked. Demosthenes suggested that they again attempt to break through the harbor barrier, but the sailors refused. Demosthenes suggested that they now flee over land, but the Syracusans sent messengers to the Athenians, disguised as sympathizers, saying the roads were blocked when they were not. The next day, the Syracusans blocked the roads, forcing the Athenians on September 11 to move overland. During the retreat, the Athenians were constantly harassed, and by September 16 the rear guard had been separated, and Demosthenes surrendered. Nicias was attacked on September 18 and surrendered to Gylippus.

The prisoners were treated harshly. The Athenian allies were kept in terrible conditions for seventy days, and the Athenians were forced to endure them for six months longer. Those who survived this misery were then either sold or made to work in public prisons. Some ultimately made it back to Athens with the news of what happened, producing panic. Nicias and Demosthenes were executed. Not only was it’s the expedition a failure, it produced a series of rebellions throughout the Athenian Empire, which took years for Athens to suppress.

Who was to blame for the disaster? There were multiple reasons since there were both policy and military failures. The policy of trying to control the entire island of Sicily was flawed without sufficient allies and resources to do so. The Athenians were too eager to believe the stories of wealth and did not prepare appropriately. Most important, they chose Nicias as commander even though he did not believe in the mission, and they recalled Alcibiades, the driving force behind the plan. Then, when the fleet arrived, the military plans were deployed disastrously. Instead of listening to Lamachus, a capable general, the Athenians failed to take the initiative and attack Syracuse. Nicias then failed to fortify the heights and complete the wall.

When Gylippus arrived, the Athenians did not immediately redouble their efforts. Nicias then showed no initiative and was completely inactive. When the second fleet arrived, Demosthenes deferred to Nicias, even though he could have overruled him. This plan, followed by the failure to retreat immediately, caused the Athenians to become trapped, and when they finally fled, they did not retreat in an organized fashion and were systematically eliminated.

The disaster, then, should be blamed on everyone: the Athenians for their policy and decisions to select Nicias and recall Alcibiades; Alcibiades for his duplicity; Nicias for his total incompetence; and Demosthenes for failing to stand up to Nicias.