Trireme Warfare: Ancient Greece’s Naval Mastery Against Persia

During the fifth century, a revolution in military practice took place with the development of the trireme, a new warship that propelled the Greeks to victory over the Persians and became the most advanced naval ship in the Athenian Empire. Navies still maintained the penteconter, or ships with twenty-five sailors and one helmsman in one line on each side, and the bireme, which had two banks of rowers. From vase paintings before 700, the penteconter was first shown, and during the next century, it became the dominant warship in the Greek world. Fast-moving, they had a single-pronged ram on the bow, made of bronze. The penteconter had twenty-four rowers and one helmsman on each side in two lines and two steering rudders on the stern. Although strong, the ship was too long and slender to maintain its steadiness and was vulnerable to rough seas. In addition, it was hard to maneuver.

The next innovation was the bireme. It too had twenty-four rowers on each side, but now they were placed in two rows, one above the other, so that twelve were along the gunwale and twelve were below them rowing through holes in the hull. This allowed the ship to be shorter and faster. It appears that this ship was invented by the Phoenicians, and it was more maneuverable than the penteconter, and with its increased speed, it could provide greater force when ramming. Its smaller size also presented a smaller target for enemy ships. Thucydides indicates that the last type of warship developed, the trireme, was a Corinthian invention. It is probable that although it was invented in the seventh century, it did not gain widespread use until the mid-sixth century.

The trireme, with three banks of rowers, allowed ships to gain in speed and maneuverability, but it required extensive training to operate. The new fleets began to come into prominence around 525, when Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, sent forty triremes to help the Persians fight the Egyptians. Once the trireme was viewed as the new ship of the line, it was extensively used throughout the Greek world. It had two rows of twenty-seven rowers at each of the two levels, and then a third row was superimposed, with thirty-one rowers on either side seated three to a bench, with each rower pulling an individual oar for a total of 170 rowers. The top rowers had the most work to do since they had the longest oars, and using them required more synchronization than the other two rows. The bottom rowers were not only beneath the other two rows of oarsmen, but they were at the water line, so they had to deal with water entering through their oar holes. The bottom two rows of oarsmen could not see the water, so they rowed blindly.

This new ship required great coordination of events and required the rowers to practice. Most likely, the signals to row were based on gestures since the noise generated by the rowers and the sea were too loud to hear voice commands. Ancient literary reference is made to chants being used and this may have been to create a regular rhythm or cycle for the rowers. The trireme had a larger bronze ram with had three prongs instead of the one prong for the bireme. The trireme had a deck for marines, with fourteen spearmen and four archers. This ship’s crew also included twenty-five petty officers and five senior officers.

The ancient navies used several strategies so their ships could overcome enemy fleets. The main plan was for a ship to ram an enemy ship to disable it. The ram (embolon) was a piece of metal on the prow, just below the water line, which would punch a hole in the hull of an enemy ship. It was common to attack the enemy ship in the rear, where it was not only most vulnerable but also presented the largest target. Another strategy was for the ship to come up beside the enemy ship, retract its oars, and then ram the enemy’s oars to break them off, disabling the ship so it could be attacked later. If the ship hit a foe at an angle, the damage could be quite extensive, not only due to the force but the angle producing a ripping effect along the hull.

The typical strategy when engaging the enemy was to get the upper hand by having the fleet sail around the enemy fleet and attack from the rear. The fleet would attempt to send some of their ships around one or both sides while the center held the enemy in check. This way, the attackers could move past the flanks and then wheel about, attacking the enemy in the rear. This tactic was called the periplous (“sailing around”). Another tactic was the diekplous (“sailing through”). This strategy concentrated a number of ships in one spot and then attacked the enemy line, punching a hole in the line by sinking a few ships and then allowing some of the attacking fleet to sail through and then wheel about and attack the enemy in the rear. Also, if the enemy fleet incurred a hole, then the attacking fleet would effectively cut the fleet in half, allowing it to deal with both groups more effectively as two smaller fleets.

The defending fleet would attempt to counter these attacks by arranging itself in a half-circle or crescent-shaped moon called the menoeides kyklos. Here, the defending fleet would draw in the center with their wings in front to pull the attackers into the middle and then they would attack them on the sides and envelop them. Or they would use the inverted moon shape to prevent the enemy from being able to sail around their flanks unopposed. Another defensive tactic was the kyklos (“circle”), where the defenders would arrange themselves in a circle with their prows sticking outward so as to protect the ships from attack and prevent the enemy from coming in at an angle to deliver a critical hit. In these maneuvers, it was important for the ships to have speed and agility. Whichever side could gain these attributes would often win.

During the Persian War, the Athenians defeated the Persian fleet at Salamis by luring the Persians into the narrow straits using the shores to protect them from being outflanked, while using their faster and more agile ships to ram the Persian ships. The narrow straits hemmed in the Persian fleet nullifying their superior numbers and preventing heir maneuverability. The Greek ships only needed to neutralize the advancing group to force the Persian fleet to a standstill; and without the ability to maneuver, the Persians could not turn and attack the Greeks who also came in from the sides.

Unlike land battles, in which the casualties were often small (no more than 15 percent of forces), at sea the losses were usually extensive. When a ship sank, many of the crew could not escape in time, and since each ship had a contingent of nearly 200 sailors, the loss of just five ships could be traumatic. Many of the victims died of drowning, and after the Battle of Arginusae, where the Athenians won but bad weather capsized a portion of their fleet, the sailors could not be rescued, and six Athenian generals were executed for incompetence. Those who did not drown but were captured were often executed on land or maimed, such as having their right hand or thumb cut off so they could not row or be sold into slavery. The loss of a fleet could result in the loss of thousands of men. Since the ships were rowed by citizens and not slaves, this reduced the power of the entire city.

Naval battles could range from a small squadron of 30 ships to a large flotilla of 200 ships. The battles in the fifth century determined the outcome of the great contests between Greece and Persia, and later between Athens and Sparta.