Battle of Thermopylae: 300 Spartans’ Last Stand Against Persia

The Battle of Thermopylae in 480 became an event celebrated both in antiquity and in modern times when a small force held off an attacking force nearly ten times or more its size. While the battle resulted in the defeat and destruction of a Greek force, it did show the superiority of the Greek infantry over the Persian forces.

The prelude to the battle began in 483, when the Persian king Xerxes ordered a force to begin excavating a canal across the region of Mount Athos to allow his fleet to sail down the coast and escape the storms that had destroyed his father Darius’s fleet nearly ten years before. In addition, Xerxes ordered the construction of two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont to allow his army to cross. Both feats were seen as tremendous accomplishments previously unheard of in the Greek world.

The army of Xerxes, said by the historian Herodotus to number over a million men, probably was more along the lines of 200,000 to 300,000. This army was composed of the numerous tribes and nations across the empire. The Athenians during this time had begun to construct a fleet on a new ship model, the trireme, similar to the Persian ships. In early 480, a force of 10,000 hoplites moved north to Thessaly and planned to block the Tempe Vale, a gorge separating Macedon from Thessaly.

When they arrived, the Greeks were informed that there were other routes that the Persians could take that would bypass the Greek army and take them from the rear. The Greek army then returned south and planned a second strategy—to defend the pass at Thermopylae. This policy effectively surrendered northern Greece (particularly Thessaly) to the Persians.

Thermopylae was well suited for the defense, with three gates or passes. The plan was to hold the passes and prevent the Persians from gaining Thebes, Athens, and the Peloponnese. The region has changed over the past 2,500 years, but in antiquity, the Gulf of Malia on the northern side came farther inland and the land from the hills (not mountains as some ancient sources say) to the gulf was constricted both naturally and artificially. It appears that the central part of the pass was marshy due to the streams, some of which were purposely diverted, that ran from the springs and hills down to the gulf. The ancients indicated that it was only wide enough for a chariot, and this probably applied to the middle part of the pass, with marshes along the sides.

The ancient Phocians who controlled the region in the sixth century had also constructed a wall in this middle part, which allowed the route to be constricted in this area and be more easily defended. While in the southern part of the pass, there were not sheer cliffs but high hills, they were sufficient to prevent cavalry from operating.

By the time the Persians began their advance, many of the Greek states had sent messengers to the Oracle of Delphi for guidance. For Sparta, the answer was conflicting—the Spartans were not to advance while the feast of Karneia was underway, but they would earn victory only when a king would perish. This prophecy was horrendous. How could Sparta achieve a victory if a Spartan king died, meaning that the army was probably defeated and destroyed?

The Greeks nevertheless learned of the arrival of the Persians in Macedon in July or August. As the army moved south, the amount of supplies could not possibly support all of the Persian forces for some time. This was a benefit for the Greeks. If the Greeks could delay them, or even better hold them off, the Persians might retreat to prevent starvation. The Greeks then sent 7,000 troops to Thermopylae, led by the Spartan king Leonidas, who brought his private bodyguard of 300 men, all of whom supposedly had children so that if they were defeated and wiped out, then their family bloodlines would continue. Accompanying these Spartans were said to be about 1,000 helots and perioeci, as well as about 4,000 other Peloponnesian troops, 1,000 Phocians, 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans, and local Opuntian Locrians, which may have numbered about 1,000.

When the Persians arrived, they found that the Greeks had reconstructed part of the wall and were preparing for battle. When Leonidas had arrived, he learned that there was a mountain pass around the main pass. He dispatched the Phocians to hold the top of the path to prevent the rest of the Greek army from being outflanked. With both Greek forces in control of the defensive networks, Xerxes waited for four days for the Greeks to surrender or flee. He sent ambassadors suggesting that the Greeks surrender and even make peace, a proposal that was refused. The Persians finally sent a herald with a written message from Xerxes, saying that the Greeks should hand over their arms, to which Leonidas responded, “Come and take them.” At the same time, to prevent the Greek army from being outflanked by sea, the Greek fleet was stationed nearby, at Artemisum.

On the fifth day of the standoff, the first day of fighting took place. Xerxes ordered his army to advance, but due to the constriction of the pass, which was probably less than 300 feet wide, the Greek hoplites were able to stand shoulder to shoulder in the traditional phalanx formation, a few lines deep, and were able to rotate fresh troops into the lines throughout the day. Xerxes ordered archers to fire their arrows, but from 300 feet away, they were ineffective against the bronze armor and large wooden shields. He then ordered 10,000 Medes to attack and seize the enemy and take them prisoner. The Greeks in front of the wall defended the frontal attack, and with their rows of men with longer spears than the enemies, they were easily able to hold them at bay. The inferiority of the Persian armor and weapons was exposed.

The initial Persian force was dramatically reduced in strength, while only two or three Spartans were killed. Xerxes, enraged, ordered the 10,000 Immortals, his personal bodyguard, to advance. Again, they were defeated, with the Spartans appearing to retreat, and when the Persians advanced freely, the Spartans turned and met the Immortals head on, cutting them down. At the end of the first day, the Greeks clearly showed the superiority of their weapons and tactics.

The second day, Xerxes again ordered a frontal assault, thinking that the Greeks had been demoralized, and once again the Greeks were successful against the Persians. Xerxes ordered his men to retreat and, despondent, tried to decide what to do next. It was apparent to him that a frontal assault could not achieve success. At this time, a local Trachinian named Ephialtes agreed to show the Persians the mountain track for a fee. Xerxes ordered his general Hydarnes who commanded the Immortals (an elite infantry unit of 10,000 men who also were the king’s bodyguard) and 20,000 men to move immediately to outflank the Greeks. The path led west over the mountains, and throughout the night the Persians moved up.

On the morning of the third day, the Phocians guarding the mountain path heard the Persians advancing and moved farther up the mountain for a better position, leaving the path undefended. The Persians kept moving, avoiding battle, and the Phocians, realizing that they had been outmaneuvered, sent a message to that effect to Leonidas. With the Persians approaching, and realizing his defensive position was compromised, Leonidas held a war council and allowed any Greek contingent to leave. About half of them left, and Leonidas remained with the helots, 700 Thespians, and 400 Thebans. They now attacked the Persians, probably hoping to confuse them into thinking that a relief force had arrived and/or that Hydarnes’s troops had been destroyed.

Xerxes ordered a fresh attack with 10,000 men. The Greeks advanced, and in a fierce battle, Leonidas was killed along with two of Darius’s brothers. The Greeks and Persians fought over Leonidas’s battle with the Greeks, recovering his body and retreating behind the wall. Taking refuge on a small hill, Hydarnes’s forces arrived and Xerxes’s army moved through the pass. The Thebans surrendered and were taken away and branded with the king’s mark. Not wishing to delay, Xerxes ordered the remnants to be killed by arrows. The Greek fleet, seeing that it was no longer needed and potentially compromised, sailed out of Artemisium to return to Athens. During their stay, the Greek fleet had fought the Persian fleet in an inconclusive battle. Afterward, Xerxes ordered the body of Leonidas to be mutilated and his body parts taken back to Persia (they were given back only forty years later, to be buried in Sparta).

Questions abound as to Leonidas’s reason for staying put. One idea was the story that the Spartans never retreated is inaccurate, although this battle increased their mystique of never surrendering. Another explanation was that Leonidas was honoring the prophecy that a king must die in order for Sparta to survive. The more plausible reason, however, was that Leonidas realized that if everyone tried to flee, then the whole Greek army would have been destroyed. By fighting for several hours, the army could flee and thus save over 3000 hoplites, who would be needed in the future. Another quandary was the role of the Thebans. They were said to be hostages, but more likely they were supporters of the Greek cause and not Persian sympathizers, although their surrender may have indicated their collaboration.

While the battle was a defeat for the Greeks, allowing the Persians to sack Thespiae, Plataea, and Athens and take Thebes, it did provide crucial time for the Greeks to deploy their army at the Isthmus of Corinth and the navy at Athens. The battle showed the superiority of the Greek infantry over the Persian army, which would have future ramifications. After the Persians left, the dead were collected and buried, and after the war, a stone lion was erected in honor of Leonidas.