Battle of Salamis: Themistocles’ Strategy & Greek Naval Triumph

After the Greek defeat at Thermopylae in late August to early September 480, the accompanying Greek fleet at Artemisium retreated from the straits of Euboea and sailed to Athens. A debate occurred in Athens as to its future plans. Some citizens argued that Athens should defend the city at all costs, while others believed that it should be evacuated. Both sides claimed guidance from the cryptic response from the Oracle of Delphi that Athens would be saved by its wooden walls. Since the Acropolis had wooden walls, some argued to stay within the city and hold out, while the Athenian general Themistocles pronounced that the wooden walls were in fact the new fleet.

In the end, both plans were followed—a small group remained behind to defend the city while the majority planned to evacuate. The fleet arriving from Artemisium helped evacuate the Athenians to safety to nearby Troezen. During the evacuation, Xerxes’s Persian army advanced from Thermopylae into Boeotia, where most of the cities, including Thebes, surrendered while Plataea and Thespinae were leveled for not submitting. Xerxes and his army now advanced toward Athens and Attica. When his army entered the city, Xerxes and his forces stormed the Acropolis, destroying the old wooden walls and razing the temples. Xerxes then supplied and refitted his ships and prepared for the next phase.

The Greek strategy was multifaceted. The Peloponnesians wanted to defend the Isthmus of Corinth, with the fleet protecting the shoreline. The Athenians believed that this strategy would allow the Persians to outflank the Greeks and land in any part of the Peloponnese, therefore bypassing the isthmus. Themistocles advocated that it was best to confront the Persians in a battle and hopefully knock them out of the war. He had learned from Artemisium that the Greeks had an advantage in confined spaces since the Persian numbers could be negated for they could not use all of their ships to encircle or engage the Greeks. His plan was to engage the Persians in the straits at Salamis, off the coast of Attica. The allies agreed to his plan.

The historian Herodotus indicated that Xerxes received information that the Greeks were divided, with the fleet from the Peloponnese wanting to sail away from Salamis. This may have been information given to the Persians by the Greeks to force a battle, or perhaps the allies were afraid that the Persians would continue their activities by sending an army to the isthmus. The Persians’ strategy was to use their superiority of numbers to overwhelm the Greeks. With their better seamanship, more ships, and better maneuverability, the Persians would achieve their best success in the open seas.

According to Herodotus, the Greek fleet numbered about 370 ships (mainly triremes), while the Persian fleet had about 800 ships, due to losses out of the original 1,200 ships sailing from Persia, at Magnesia and Artemisium and caused by storms. It is possible that the fleet was smaller if replacements did not fully arrive or failed to in sufficient numbers. The Persians were better sailors and their ships were more maneuverable. The Persians therefore outnumbered the Greeks at least two to one. Xerxes’s arrival and outfitting of ships probably took place in mid-September, but there is no real chronology given in the sources. It appears that Xerxes and his general, Mardonius, wanted to engage the Greek fleet, while his advisor and admiral, Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, recommended delaying any attack and letting the Greeks surrender after dissension occurred within their ranks. Xerxes rejected her advice and pressed for an attack.

Upon receiving news of the dissension in the Greek fleet, Xerxes now decided to put into play his attempt to force a battle. He initially planned to block the southern end of the straits to prevent the Greek fleet from fleeing. Xerxes then ordered them back, perhaps hoping to catch the Greek fleet fleeing or to pursue them so they could attack. During the night, the allies debated as to whether they should leave, as the Peloponnese fleet wished, or engage the Persians, as Themistocles desired. Given that the Peloponnese fleet accepted Themistocles’s plan, it may also have been a party to the ruse. According to Herodotus, Themistocles sent a servant who informed Xerxes that Themistocles was really favorable to the Persians, the Greek fleet planned to break up and sail away, and in order to prevent their escape, they should blockade the straits. Themistocles appears to have wanted the Persians to attack the Greek fleet, and his disinformation was meant to entice the Persians.

Xerxes planned to attack the Greek fleet in the straits the next day and ordered a throne to be set up above the straits so he could watch the battle. It is unclear if the Persians entered the straits at night (probably not) or early in the morning. Supposedly, the Egyptian fleet was sent to the eastern edge to prevent escape. Although the Greek fleet took its directives from Themistocles, the leadership of the navy was under the command of Sparta. Most of the Greek cities desired Sparta to take the leadership of the defense of Greece and were probably wary of Themistocles and Athens. Although Themistocles created the strategy and tactics for the battle, he was denied the honor of taking command.

As at Thermopylae, where the geography benefited the Greeks, so too was Salamis. The Athenians were probably positioned on the shoreline of Salamis opposite Attica in a north-to-south arrangement. It is possible that the Greek fleet was positioned across the straits east to west, but that would have made them touch the Persian disposition and invite possible engagement before all sides were ready.

The Persians were initially arranged east to west to block the exit from the straits, and at some point, they moved into the straits so that they were positioned north to south. It is unclear if the Persian fleet waited to enter the straits in the morning or if they had moved into the narrow straits during the evening. Given the difficulty of maneuvering at night and the danger of mayhem produced from an accidental engagement, it is probable that the Persians waited until morning. When they entered the straits, the fleet had to bunch up due to the number of ships and the small width of the straits. As the Persian fleet entered the straits, they were now arranged north to south, with Attica to their rear and facing Salamis, and the Greek fleet was also arranged north to south.

On the Persian right, to the north, were the Phoenicians, and opposite them on the Greek left were the Athenians. On the left flank of the Persian fleet were the Ionians, and opposite them were the Spartans. Finally, in the center of both fleets were the remaining allies. It appears that the Egyptian fleet sailed around the island to block the northern exit, which would make sense since Xerxes planned to keep the Greek fleet from sailing away.

The Persian fleet now engaged the Athenians at dawn. It is probable that the Persian sailors did not get much rest since they were being vigilant to prevent the Greeks from fleeing. The Greeks, knowing that they were not going to flee, probably got a good night’s rest. At dawn, the Greek marines boarded their ships and sailed out. At this point, the Persian fleet attacked. They were three rows deep, while the Greeks were arranged in two rows. This disposition resulted in the two sides being roughly equal in breadth, but now the Persians were bunched upped and hemmed in, with Attica in their rear, and could not maneuver. The Persians became disorganized, and with the Greeks still in formation, the Greeks began to retreat in an organized fashion, perhaps to get a more favorable wind. As the fleet retreated, the Persians moved forward, and then a single Greek ship rammed the nearest Persian ship (with Athenians and Aeginetans each claiming the honor).

At this signal, the entire Greek fleet attacked. The Greeks were able to push the first row of the Persian fleet back, and this in turn resulted in the second and third rows pushing forward. Therefore, the Persians’ ships were not able to turn. The Persian admiral, Ariabignes, the brother of Xerxes, was killed, leaving the Persians without a leader. It is said that Artemisia found his body in the water and returned it to Xerxes. The Phoenician fleet was pushed back and ran aground. The center of the Greek fleet successfully split the Persian fleet in two, creating more dissension. Artemisia and her fleet tried to escape, and to accomplish this, they rammed other Persian ships as she fled. Xerxes, seeing this and believing that he was ramming Greek ships, remarked that his men were fighting like women and his women like men.

The Persian fleet tried to retreat, and in the process it was attacked by the Aeginetans, causing even more disaster. The remnants of the Persian fleet now sailed back to the harbor at Phalerum at Athens. In addition to the losses suffered in the battle (probably around 200 to 300 ships), many of the sailors drowned since they did not know how to swim. Herodotus reported that the Greeks lost forty ships. The Greeks sent an armed force to the small island of Psyttaleia, where a small Persian force was garrisoned to deal with any Greeks who had ran ashore but now found itself under attack.

Xerxes now looked to blame someone. He ordered some Phoenicians to be executed for starting the attack, and then for cowardice afterward, but that night the Phoenicians sailed back to Asia Minor, depriving Xerxes of his best sailors. Realizing that the battle had thwarted his plans, Xerxes decided to withdraw from Greece with the majority of his army, probably to prevent any rebellion in Asia Minor. He immediately made way to the Hellespont so he could arrive before the Greeks could destroy the bridge across the Hellespont. Themistocles had already planted the seeds of this strategy when he sent his servant to Xerxes to tell him that Themistocles had not wanted to attack the Persians and in fact wanted to warn Xerxes of the Greek intent of destroying the bridge. Mardonius now remained, with about 200,000 men, and wintered in Thebes.

Salamis was a complete victory for the Greek fleet. As at Thermopylae, Salamis showed how topography could greatly influence the outcome of a battle. The constricted space allowed the Greeks to use their smaller numbers to better advantage. Xerxes’s poor leadership and lack of tactical ability led to the disaster. If he had followed Artemisia’s advice and waited, the Greek fleet probably would have broken up, allowing the Persians to attack piecemeal. In addition, he could have sent his fleet around the Peloponnese to land at any number of places that the Greeks could not adequately defend.

The major issues that the Persians faced were the potential lack of resources needed to supply the army and fleet and the danger of rebellion in Asia Minor. Xerxes had hoped to knock the Greeks out in one quick battle, but with his failure, Xerxes realized that the war would be prolonged. The Persians had suffered a major humiliation in the defeat. The plan now was to have Mardonius continue the war by defeating the Greeks in a land engagement.