Pompey the Great: Triumph, Political Paralysis, and Crisis

The Triumph of Pompey the Great and the Political Stagnation of the Late Roman Republic
"Caesar had accustomed himself to great effort and little rest; to concentrate on his friends' business at the expense of his own, and never to neglect anything which was worth doing as a favour. He craved great imperium, an army, and a new war so that he could show his talent." – Sallust, late sixties BC.¹

"Yet what would history say of me in six hundred years time? For that is a thing which I fear more than the idle chatter of men alive today." – Cicero, April 59 BC.²

The Splendor and Quantifiable Scale of the Third Triumph. On 28 and 29 September 61 BC, Pompey the Great (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus) celebrated his third triumph, which commemorated his historical military victories over the Mediterranean pirates and Mithridates VI of Pontus. The grand festivities coincided with his forty-fifth birthday and included public displays and processions of unprecedented scale and magnificence in Late Republican Rome. His first triumph had been celebrated twenty years prior, but this time there was no ridiculous plan for riding in a chariot pulled by elephants. Pompey was older, more mature, and had no need for such theatrics, for the sheer splendor of his military victories dwarfed the historical achievements of the great generals of the Roman past.

The Quantifiable Impact of Pompeian Conquests. Even so, Roman triumphs were never occasions for restraint or modesty. Like any Roman aristocrat, Pompey took care to precisely quantify his military success, ensuring the processions included elaborate placards declaring that he had killed, captured, or defeated 12,183,000 people, taken or sunk 846 warships, and accepted the formal surrender of 1,538 towns or fortified places. Each kingdom, nation, or location he had overcome was explicitly listed in turn on the great floats carrying the vast spoils he had seized. Furthermore, paintings were displayed showing famous military episodes from the campaigns, while explanatory signs proclaimed that every soldier in the Roman army had received 1,500 denarii—equivalent to more than ten years' standard pay—and declared that the vast sum of 20,000 talents of gold and silver had been directly contributed to the Roman State Treasury (aerarium). Pompey proudly boasted that as a direct result of his military efforts, the total annual revenue of the Roman Republic had more than doubled, increasing dramatically from 50 million to 135 million denarii.

Symbolism of Universal Conquest. At the culmination of the procession was an enormous float presented as a trophy of complete victory over the known world. Citizens were saying that Pompey had triumphed over all three continents: Africa during his first triumph, Europe (specifically Hispania) in his second, and now Asia in his third conquest. Walking ahead of Pompey were over 300 senior hostages, including client kings, queens, princesses, local chieftains, and military generals, all dressed in their traditional national attire. Pompey himself rode in a triumphal chariot decorated with precious gemstones and wore a ceremonial cloak captured from Mithridates, which he claimed had once been owned and worn by Alexander the Great. Appian, writing over a century and a half later, considered this claim unlikely, yet Pompey revelled in the ideological parallels drawn between himself and the greatest military conqueror in ancient history.³

Military Campaigns and Eastern Reorganization. There is no doubting the immense scale of Pompey’s strategic achievement. The systematic suppression of the Mediterranean pirates had been a dazzling display of meticulous organizational planning and rapid execution, but it proved to be merely a prelude to even greater military successes in the East. Mithridates VI of Pontus had long proven one of Rome's most resilient and dangerous enemies. Lucius Cornelius Sulla had previously expelled him from Greece and recovered the Roman province of Asia, but the urgent necessity to return to Italy during the civil war had prevented Sulla from achieving total victory.

The Strategic Succession from Lucullus to Pompey. Lucius Licinius Lucullus had accomplished substantial progress in the seven years he held the Eastern command, heavily defeating the Pontic king and his regional allies across a series of battles. In the process, Lucullus became fabulously wealthy from the spoils of war, but he severely alienated the publicani operating in Asia as tax collectors, as well as many of his own legions. A successful general never lacked political opponents in the Roman Senate, as senators were instinctively nervous of anyone accumulating excessive glory (gloria), military wealth, and political influence (auctoritas). There were growing complaints in the Senate that the Eastern war was dragged out, with accusations that Lucullus was deliberately prolonging operations to enrich himself further. Consequently, his major command was subdivided, and key sections were reassigned to new provincial governors, depriving him of necessary troops and materiel. With Lucullus politically weakened, Mithridates found an opportunity to reclaim lost territory.

Total Defeat of Mithridates and Eastern Annexation. Everything shifted decisively when Pompey took command in 66 BC under the provisions of the Lex Manilia. Backed by military and financial resources on a scale that his predecessor could only dream of, Pompey irrevocably smashed the power of Mithridates by the end of that same year. While it would be an overstatement to claim Lucullus had already finished the war—unlike the Third Servile War, which had been effectively decided by Marcus Licinius Crassus before Pompey arrived to claim credit—Lucullus had nevertheless contributed significantly to the ultimate Roman victory.

Diplomatic and Territorial Reorganization of the Near East. His primary military task completed, Pompey demonstrated no desire to return to Rome immediately, seeking instead new opportunities to gain prestige with the legions under his command. Over the next two years, he pushed his army further than any Roman military force had previously advanced. His legions marched against the Iberians and Albanians, navigated the eastern shore of the Black Sea, and penetrated territories extending toward modern southern Russia. Intervening in a dynastic civil war between rival members of the Hasmonean royal family in Judaea, Pompey laid siege to Jerusalem, capturing the city after three months. All of these achievements were subsequently commemorated in his triumph. Throughout these campaigns, Pompey exhibited supreme command ability, occasionally leading tactical charges in person to emulate Alexander the Great's heroic style of leadership. In Jerusalem, Pompey and his commanders entered the Holy of Holies within the Temple, a sacred zone strictly forbidden to all except the Jewish High Priest. As a sign of administrative restraint, none of the Temple treasury was removed, though the act itself provided Rome with a famous narrative of its general's power.

Legislative and Administrative Legacy. Pompey spent much of his remaining time structuring the administration of Rome's existing eastern provinces and establishing new administrative units. Active military campaigning largely ceased when news arrived in 63 BC that Mithridates was dead—killed by a bodyguard after a failed suicide attempt by poison, rendered ineffective due to the monarch's lifelong consumption of antidotes (mithridatism). Pompey remained in the East for over a year to settle the region politically. His organizational capabilities were vast, and the legal regulations (acta) he established in the East remained in force for centuries.⁴

Political Resistance and Domestic Polarization in Rome. The political activity of Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos during his tribunate raised apprehension in Rome regarding Pompey’s intentions upon returning to Italy. Nepos, who was Pompey's brother-in-law and had served as his military legate, demonstrated a readiness to employ public political pressure and legal intimidation to allow Pompey to retain command. Crassus reportedly exploited the tense public mood by taking his family abroad temporarily. Although it remains unclear whether Nepos acted under direct instructions, Pompey was displeased by actions that heightened senatorial suspicion without yielding political advantages. In the spring of 62 BC, Pompey addressed both the Senate as a body and leading senators privately, assuring them of his desire for a peaceful return to civilian life. Simultaneously, another of his legates, Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus, canvassed for the consulship of 61 BC. Pompey requested that the Senate postpone the consular elections so he could personally support Piso’s campaign. While senatorial opinion was divided, Marcus Porcius Cato (Cato the Younger) blocked the motion through filibuster procedures, speaking continuously until the session ended.

Demobilization and Entry into the Civil Sphere. Piso secured the consulship regardless, but this marked the beginning of systematic senatorial opposition against Pompey. To demonstrate his peaceful intentions, upon landing at Brundisium in December 62 BC, Pompey immediately demobilized his legions, instructing his veterans to reassemble only for the celebration of his formal triumph.⁵

Legal Constraints and Political Friction. Prior to celebrating his triumph, Pompey was legally restricted from crossing the pomerium—the sacred religious boundary of Rome—and took up residence at his villa in the Alban Hills. Because substantial urban developments of Rome extended beyond the pomerium by the middle of the first century BC, the Senate occasionally convened in exterior venues to allow Pompey’s participation. After his first consulship in 70 BC, Pompey had commissioned the scholar Marcus Terentius Varro to compose a manual on senatorial procedure; nevertheless, his return to domestic politics highlighted his detachment from constitutional maneuvering after six years on campaign. His initial public addresses failed to gain political traction. Furthermore, his arrival coincided with the scandal surrounding Publius Clodius Pulcher and the sacrilege at the festival of the Bona Dea. Piso supported Clodius, whereas his consular colleague opposed him. Unskilled in forensic rhetoric, Pompey's guarded statements pleased neither faction. Cicero, offended by Pompey’s reluctance to explicitly praise his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, expressed criticism in his private correspondence. On 25 January 61 BC, Cicero wrote to Atticus that Pompey openly claimed friendship while harbouring jealousy, asserting that Pompey lacked political tact, statesmanlike vision, and moral integrity.⁶ Cicero notably welcomed Crassus's public praise in the Senate, which capitalized on Pompey’s silence.⁷

Diplomatic Rejections and Domestic Ruptures. Domestic affairs provided no political relief. Upon returning to Italy, Pompey divorced his wife Mucia Tertia due to public scandal surrounding her infidelity with Julius Caesar and others. Politically, this move alienated Pompey from her influential half-brothers, Metellus Nepos and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer. To forge a new political alliance with the senatorial elite, Pompey proposed a double marriage alliance with the family of Cato, requesting Cato’s nieces for himself and his son. Cato rejected the proposal outright, choosing to uphold his moral principles over political alignment with Rome's wealthiest general. This rejection reinforced Cato’s reputation for uncompromising political integrity (virtus).⁸

Institutional Deadlock and the Crisis of 60 BC. Pompey pursued two primary legislative objectives during this period:

1. Securing land grants (agri adsignatio) for his discharged military veterans.

2. Obtaining formal senatorial ratification of his Eastern Settlement (acta).

Senatorial Opposition to Pompeian Reform. Although a land distribution law had been passed in 70 BC for his veterans from the Spanish campaigns against Sertorius, the Senate had withheld the necessary financial resources, rendering the measure ineffective. Regarding his Eastern Settlement, standard procedure required a senatorial commission to review and approve territorial adjustments. Pompey had executed these reorganizations independently, and despite their efficiency, drew heavy criticism. Lucullus, emerging from political retirement, demanded that each administrative decision be evaluated individually rather than ratified as a single comprehensive block (en bloc). Lucullus, Cato, and conservative senators (optimates) effectively blocked legislative progress throughout 61 BC. Realizing that Metellus Celer would win the consulship for 60 BC, Pompey utilized significant financial resources to secure the election of his former legate Lucius Afranius as co-consul. However, Afranius proved politically ineffective, earning the contempt of contemporaries like Cicero.

The Tribune Flavius and Constitutional Escalation. A line of action was initiated by the tribune Lucius Flavius, who introduced a agrarian law benefiting both Pompey’s veterans and the urban poor. Metellus Celer opposed the bill vigorously, leading Flavius to order the consul's imprisonment. In response, Metellus Celer convened a meeting of the Senate inside the prison cell itself. When Flavius placed his tribunician bench before the entrance to block access, Metellus ordered a hole breached in the prison wall to admit senators. Recognizing the political optics were turning negative, Pompey instructed Flavius to release the consul. Subsequent political maneuvers to restrict Metellus’s provincial command also failed, forcing the withdrawal of the land bill.⁹

Financial Crises and the Tax Reform Stalemate. By 60 BC, after two years of political gridlock, Pompey had achieved neither the settlement ratification nor veteran land allocations. Concurrently, Crassus became embroiled in a separate conflict with the Senate regarding the publicani. Tax-farming syndicates that had contracted to collect revenues in the province of Asia found themselves unable to meet their financial obligations due to wartime devastation. Supported by Crassus, who held financial investments in these enterprise companies, the publicani petitioned the Senate for a renegotiation of their contract terms. Cicero supported the petition on pragmatic grounds to preserve the political alliance between the senatorial order and the equestrian order (concordia ordinum). However, Cato opposed the concession, viewing it as financial corruption, and successfully persuaded the Senate to reject the petition. Cicero observed that Cato, despite his honesty, damaged state interests by acting as if he were in Plato’s Republic rather than the political reality of Rome.¹⁰

Systemic Paralysis and Historical Significance. Thus, Pompey and Crassus—the two most powerful figures in Rome—found their legislative goals consistently blocked by a faction of conservative aristocrats in the Senate. Necessary agrarian, administrative, and financial reforms were stalled by political inertia. Decades later, historians would identify 60 BC—the consular year of Metellus Celer and Lucius Afranius—as the critical turning point where the structural paralysis of the Roman Republic became irreversible, setting the stage for the formation of the First Triumvirate.¹¹

Notes and Historical Citations: ¹ Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 54.6. ² Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, 2.5.1. ³ Appian, Mithridatica, 117. ⁴ Plutarch, Life of Pompey, 45.1–5. ⁵ Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History, 2.40.3. ⁶ Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, 1.13.4. ⁷ Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, 1.14.3. ⁸ Plutarch, Life of Cato the Younger, 30.2–5. ⁹ Dio Cassius, Roman History, 37.50.1–4. ¹⁰ Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, 2.1.8. ¹¹ Asinius Pollio, Histories, cited in Horace, Odes, 2.1.1.