Arms Control Measures

Introduction. Given concerns that certain states and substate actors have either pursued or expressed an interest in pursuing an offensive biological weapons capability, and in view of the implications of September 11th and the Fall 2001 anthrax letters incident with respect to homeland security and defense in the United States, the need for strategic measures to specifically address the threat of deliberate biological weapons use has become increasingly clear both in the United States and internationally.

Likewise, the continued threat of pandemic influenza and other emerging infectious diseases around the world has underscored the need for crossover application of such measures to address disease outbreaks of natural etiology, and synergy with existent public and animal health measures to this end on a local, national, and international level. A network of barriers addressing sequential steps along the time line leading up to, including, and following a biological event, whether of natural or deliberate origin, minimizes both the likelihood and potential effects of such an event.

For a deliberate biological event (i.e., attack) to occur, a number of things must happen (Pilch, 2003). First, a potential perpetrator must decide to pursue a biological weapons capability. Second, the perpetrator must attain that capability by acquiring a pathogenic or toxigenic agent, producing an amount of the agent or its toxin sufficient for use as a weapon, formulating the product ifpossible for enhanced stability and overall effect, and establishing a reliable delivery method.

(Toxins, which are defined as chemicals of biological origin, make up a so-called gray area between biological and chemical weapons, but are considered in the context of biological weapons for the purposes of this article.) Third, the perpetrator must decide to use this weapon. And fourth, a successful attack must be carried out.

‘Success’ in the case of a terrorist event might be defined in a number of ways, from demonstrating the ability to effectively deliver a viable biological agent to cause a single case of disease to creating a sustained outbreak, whereas ‘success’ in a wartime or criminal event might considerably differ, given the different goals of such events.

For the purposes of this article, bioterrorism is defined as ‘‘the use of pathogens or toxins against human, animal, or plant populations by a terrorist group to achieve political, social, or religious aims’’ (Zilinskas and Carus, 2002). Biological warfare is defined as ‘‘the use of pathogens or toxins against human, animal, or plant populations by a state or sub-state actor to achieve military aims’’ (Zilinskas and Carus, 2002).

Biocriminality is defined as ‘‘the use of pathogens or toxins by an individual or group to attack human, animal, or plant populations for reasons of greed, blackmail, revenge, or other apolitical objectives’’ (Zilinskas and Carus, 2002). It should be noted that it is often challenging to distinguish between these events.

This article describes a stepwise approach to addressing the threat of a deliberate biological event along this continuum, using the ‘seven D’s’ of national security. (The ‘seven D’s’ is not the author’s original idea; nor am I aware of any preceding reference to or application of the ‘seven D’s’ approach. It is credited to an anonymous attendee of the l’Institut Francais des Relations Internationales seminar, “Biotechnologies, Biological Weapons, and Bioterrorism,” Paris, 2003, where an early iteration of the idea was presented in open forum.) Each ‘D’ aligns with a chronological node where barriers might be implemented, from the initial interest of a potential perpetrator to the ultimate use of a weapon and resulting response.

The ‘D’s are not independent but rather may influence one another considerably, such that barriers at one chronological node may affect barriers at other nodes in either direction along the continuum. They are:

1. Dissuasion
2. Disarmament
3. Denial
4. Disruption
5. Deterrence
6. Detection
7. Defense.

Each ‘D’ is discussed below, first providing a general description of the node, then describing specific barriers that might be implemented at the node, as well as their advantages and limitations. Each discussion concludes with recommendations for strengthening or supplementing existent barriers for the node in question. Discussions focus on terrorism as opposed to warfare or criminality, with barriers directed accordingly. Biological agents considered are limited to those agents that appear in the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) categorical listing of biological agents, and discussions are limited to human disease (Rotz, 2002).

Dissuasion. The goal of dissuasion is to counter the initial interest of a potential perpetrator to seek out a biological weapons capability. This primarily involves emphasizing the effects of the weapons themselves, which, given the prolonged course of debilitation and resultant morbidity and mortality associated with infection or intoxication, are widely perceived to be particularly cruel on a human level when compared to conventional and even other nonconventional weapons.

Furthermore, the unpredictable nature of biological weapons allows for the possibility of a so-called boomerang effect, such that on attack, a perpetrator and/or his/her constituency may become exposed to the released agent, either in addition to or instead of the target population.

Such arguments may be of little value in the real world, however, because realities may differ based on the context in which they are experienced. For example, while individuals in certain developed countries may find a moral argument compelling, individuals in parts of the developing world may adhere to a vastly different moral code shaped by personal, familial, or community suffering, particularly in the face of regional strife (e.g., as in Iraq).

In such cases, biological weapons might be seen as offering a relatively inexpensive and readily concealable, asymmetrical solution to a regional threat or its transnational support base, particularly if applicable belief systems or ideologies failed to prohibit or even encouraged such action (e.g., as in apocalyptic groups).

As another example, many analysts continue to consider the so-called lone actor, a deranged/ disgruntled scientist in the mold of the Unabomber, to be the greatest categorical threat with respect to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and biological weapons in particular, even in the face of September 11, 2001, largely because his/her perceived psychopathology may render him/her immune to dissuasion.

In other words, in addition to having the technical capability (and often resources) to carry out an attack, the lone actor may be less likely to operate under the same moral constraints as the population at large and arguably even terrorist organizations to some degree. (Terrorist organizations rely on their constituencies to maintain cash flow and otherwise support operations such that those organizations radical enough to pursue and ultimately use WMD face the challenge of maintaining their constituencies long enough to develop the technical capability to do so.)

A review of the open literature reveals little about public diplomacy and influence campaigns conducted by the United States or other countries to dissuade potential terrorists in any capacity, but it can be safely assumed that such campaigns are underway in the Middle East and beyond. Unlike psychological operations (PSYOPS), which are primarily directed toward countering propaganda and reinforcing national objectives, influence campaigns are directed toward building bridges founded on a universal truth with which all can identify. Public health thus provides a clear opportunity in this regard: diseases don’t respect international boundaries nor should the Hippocratic oath, making cooperation in times of crisis grounds for confidence-building, goodwill, and the hope for change.

Other examples include human rights, landmine awareness, and environmental preservation campaigns. Ultimately, dissuading potential perpetrators from the path to violence by way of such influence campaigns must remain an ongoing focus of U.S. and other countries’ efforts in the so-called War on Terror, but nevertheless represents only the first of many approaches to countering a deliberate biological event.

Disarmament. If dissuasion is ineffective and a potential perpetrator decides to pursue a biological weapons capability, s/he must next attain three major assets generally required for such a capability: (1) the biological agent itself; (2) the equipment/infrastructure necessary for its acquisition, production, formulation, and delivery; and (3) the expertise necessary for the same. Most biological agents are widely available in both nature and the laboratory (where legitimate research, e.g., on pathogenesis and therapy, is performed).

As well, both the equipment/infrastructure and expertise necessary to produce a bulk amount of agent, formulate it, and deliver it are largely dual use in nature, meaning that the same materials and thus knowledge required for the peaceful development and production of experimental and commercial products like food additives, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and vaccines can be diverted toward weapons-related applications with relative ease. Regardless, options exist to address the availability of these assets, including disarmament, denial, and disruption.

Disarmament means the abolition of not only biological weapons themselves but also the means to possess or use them, and is founded on the idea that without offensively directed, state-level, or substate weapons programs or their remnants, overcoming the technical hurdles toward attaining a weapons capability is largely left to potential perpetrators themselves, who may have limited means to do so.

Two international treaties are of primary consideration in this regard: (1) the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC, 1972), which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons - ‘use’ is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (BWC, 1925) - and contains no intrinsic mechanisms to verify compliance; and (2) the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (OPCW, 1993), which is relevant in the context of biological weapons because toxins fall under its purview and provides verification of compliance on the part of its members.

For the purposes of this article, the CWC will be considered only in reference to provisions of the BWC. Membership in these Conventions, while encouraged, remains voluntary; each boasts over 170 States Parties at the time of this writing.

The BWC consists of 15 short sections, or Articles, four of which (Articles I, III, IV, and X) are of particular relevance to this discussion. Article I contains the primary prohibition against biological weapons, and, as noted, extends beyond development and possession of the weapons themselves to address the proliferation of related materials and technologies as well.

Each State Party ... undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. (BWC, 1972: 2)

Article III restricts the transfer of all items covered by Article I to substate actors, including terrorist groups, and is thus of direct relevance to terrorism:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified. ... (BWC, 1972: 2)

Article IV affirms the need for national measures to impede proliferation, such that the provisions of this and other relevant international agreements are implemented by States Parties as part of their national legal framework.

Each State Party to this Convention shall ... take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. (BWC, 1972: 2)

‘Peaceful’ applications of these same materials remain preserved by Article X:
... the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. (BWC, 1972: 3-4)

As noted, the primary limitation of the BWC is its lack of compliance and verification measures, hence the failure to detect and address substantial covert biological weapons programs in the past (e.g., in the former Soviet Union and Iraq). By comparison, the CWC possesses a rigorous compliance protocol and is thus widely considered the stronger of the two Conventions. While the CWC compliance protocol may one day serve as a template for similar provisions in the BWC, incorporation of such provisions requires caution on at least two fronts.

First, the aforementioned dual-use nature of the three major assets required for a biological weapons capability complicates verification considerably, a limitation further compounded by modern clean-in-place technology, which allows for the clearance of research and development as well as production pathways within hours, and which might therefore be used to conceal a given facility’s true activities. This so-called dual-use dilemma ultimately necessitates that the motivation(s) behind any activity with potential dual-use implications be clarified to determine whether it is in breach of the BWC.

Second, the number of stakeholders who would conceivably be affected by a BWC compliance protocol far outweighs that of the CWC, given the comparative investment of resources across research, business, and industry; stakeholders desiring to protect these investments have little incentive to disclose confidential business information, particularly with respect to the ever-growing and now interdisciplinary field of biotechnology.

Regardless, the utility of the BWC hinges on the development of an effective, multilateral verification strategy, without which the Convention will remain incapable of disarming states, whether preemptively or after the fact, and thus of limiting the proliferation of such arms or their related assets to other states or substate actors.